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Comments and Casenotes
THE EFFECT OF THE DEAD MAN'S 'STATUTE ON
THE TESTIMONY 'OF A PARTY-WITNESS
Ridgley v. Beatty'
The plaintiff, son-in-law of the decedent, sued the execu-
tor of her estate on a promissory note given by the de-
cedent to the plaintiff to reimburse him for moneys he had
expended at her request. Judgment was rendered for the
plaintiff by the Circuit Court of Baltimore County, and
the executor appealed, contending that the trial court
had erred in allowing the plaintiff to testify in violation
of the Dead Man's Statute. Specifically, the executor
objected to the introduction of evidence as to payments on
the decedent's mortgage and other bills made by the son-
in-law to third persons, asserting that the relevance of
these payments was to show a consideration for the note
in question. According to the executor, such evidence
was barred by the statutory prohibition against proof of
agreements between the plaintiff and the decedent. The
Court of Appeals denied this contention and, in affirming
the judgment of the trial court, held that the son-in-law
was properly permitted to identify each check which he
had given to a third person and which represented pay-
ments on behalf of the decedent, and to describe the
check and state the items for which the check was given.
There is no doubt that, absent special circumstances,
the prohibition of the Dead Man's Statute will preclude
proof via the testimony of an interested survivor as to
a statement made by or transaction had with a decedent
in the execution of a promissory note like the one sued
on here; but, as the Court points out, "the statute does
222 Md. 76, 159 A. 2d 651 (1960).
4 MD. CODE (1957) Art. 35, § 3, provides:
"In actions or proceedings by or against executors, administrators,
heirs, devisees, legatees, or distributpes of a decedent as such, in
which judgments or decrees may be rendered for or against them,
and in proceedings by or against persons incompetent to testify by
reason of mental disability, no party to the cause shall be allowed to
testify as to any transaction had with, or statement made by the
testator, intestate ancestor or party so Incompetent to testify, either
personally or through an agent since dead, lunatic or insane, unless
called to testify by the opposite party, or unless the testimony of
such testator, intestate, ancestor, or party incompetent to testify shall
have already given in evidence, concerning the same transaction or
statement, in the same cause, on his or her own behalf or on behalf of
his or her representative in interest. .. "
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not go so far as to render a party within its terms abso-
lutely incompetent as a witness."3 Thus, testimony as
to the giving of checks or the making of cash payments to
the decedent's creditors could not be properly excluded
by the court as long as the party witness did not connect
these payments with any agreement or understanding
had with the decedent. In the present case, the dealings
about which the plaintiff testified were with third persons
and, therefore, could not constitute a direct transaction
with the decedent.
Since the precise question presented here is admittedly
novel to the Maryland court, it is important to consider
decisions on similar questions in other jurisdictions. In
a Kentucky case, it was held that the testimony of the
husband that he paid his deceased wife's nursing bills
was beyond the prohibition of the Dead Man's Statute.4
Such payment constituted a transaction between him and
third persons (nurses) and was neither a transaction with
his wife nor an act done by the wife. Similarly, the
Supreme Court of California allowed the plaintiff to iden-
tify a promissory note given to her by the decedent during
his life as the note described in the pleadings and per-
mitted her to testify that her claim on the note had not
been paid.' However, the statutory prohibition prevented
her testifying as to transactions which had occurred prior
to the death of the decedent. A New York case allowed
the claimant to testify that she alone had paid for family
supplies and foodstuffs, since such testimony related to
transactions between her and third persons, namely the
tradesmen, and not with the decedent.6
The Maryland Court of Appeals in citing a New Jersey
case,7 seems to approve the following test used by that
court for determining what is excluded as a "transaction
with" a decedent in the statutory sense: "whether, in
case the witness testifies falsely, the deceased, if living,
could contradict it of his own knowledge."' Such a test,
however, can only be useful if applied with reservation
to a limited fact-situation. For example, applying the test
to the present case dealing with checks given and cash
paid by the plaintiff to third persons, the court held that
"the decedent, if living, could not of her own knowledge
'9Supra, n. 1, 654.
'Williams v. Balmut, 298 Ky. 249, 182 S.W. 2d 779, 781 (1944).
Herbert v. Lankershim, 9 Cal. 2d 409, 71 P. 2d 220, 222 (1937).
6 Sager v. Door, 51 Hun. 642, 4 N.Y.S. 568, 569 (1889).
7Hollister v. Fiedler, 17 N.J. 239, 111 A. 2d 57, 62 (1955).
8 Supra, n. 1, 655.
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have contradicted the witness," and concluded that such
"evidence was not barred by the statute and was there-
fore properly admitted."' But the same test applied to
the testimony of the survivor of an auto collision would
exclude his observations as to the movement of his car,
or the course and speed of the decedent's car, etc., a result
directly contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals
in the recent Maryland case of Shaneybrook v. Blizzard."
As pointed out in, that decision, the word "transaction"
in the Statute imports a mutuality or concert of action,
whereas the relationship between the respective drivers
was fortuitous and involuntary."
The Dead Man's Statute requires three things if it is
to operate to exclude testimony. First, there must be a
protected party against whom the testimony is offered.
Article 35, Section 3, specifically identifies such persons:
executors, administrators, heirs, devisees, legatees, or dis-
tributees of a decedent. In its interpretation, of this sec-
tion, the Maryland Court of Appeals has adopted a narrow
construction as exemplified by several rulings. The Court,
in admitting evidence by parties in caveat proceedings,
found that such proceedings are not within the prohibition
of the Statute, since the action is not brought against
the executors as such but specifically for the purpose of
agreeing on an executor.'2 This section was also held
not applicable to action by a once-named beneficiary of an
insurance policy against the last-named beneficiary to re-
cover proceeds of the policies; the claimant's testimony
as to agreements or transactions with the decedent did
not affect the interests of any of the parties specifically
set out in the Statute. 3
Secondly, there must be a witness whom the Statute
renders incompetent. For example, in a suit against an
executor for compensation for board and services fur-
nished by the plaintiff to the testator, the plaintiff would
be incompetent to testify as to services rendered and
9 Id.
- 209 Md. 304, 121 A. 2d 218 (1955).
uSo, it would seem from the reasoning in the Shaneybrook case that
if the decedent in the subject ease had without the plaintiff's knowledge
observed the plaintiff paying the bills, the Statute should not apply, and
it is arguable that the game result should be reached if the decedent's
presence had been known but was irrelevant to the transaction which in
fact took place.
1.Griffith v. Benzinger, 144 Md. 575, 125 A. 512 (1924); Hamilton v.
Hamilton, 131 Md. 508, 120 A. 761 (1917).
Is Sheeler v. Sheeler, 207 Md. 264, 114 A. 2d 62 (1954).
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compensation received, 4 but, a third, person may testify, 5
although the presence of such third person who is com-
petent to testify does not remove the statutory bar as
to the party." Also, relying on Article 35, Section 3, the
Court of Appeals prohibited the testimony of a third
person who repeated self-serving declarations made by a
party to the suit.' In that case an executor brought suit
to recover money transferred by the decedent prior to
his death, and, the lower court erroneously permitted the
witness to testify to certain things that the party-defendant
had told her with reference to services performed for the
decedent.'8 In another case the Court held that the stock-
holders of a corporate plaintiff are not parties to the
suit within the meaning of the Statute9 and would be
competent witnesses. On the other hand, a nominal party
to a suit has been included within the prohibition, 'despite
the fact that he has no interest in the outcome."
Though the Dead Man's Statute may bar the testimony
of a party-witness, case law allows third persons to testify
to statements made by or transactions had with the dece-
dent. For example, in a suit in assumpsit against an
executrix, the plaintiff's son, present when his mother
made an agreement with the decedent, was permitted to
testify as to the agreement while his mother could not."
Further, under the waiver provision of Article 35, Sec-
tion 3, a witness called to testify by the opposite party may
testify responsively to otherwise prohibited matters. When
the opposite party asks a question, he not only invites
but requires an answer and thereby waives any right to
object to a responsive answer.22
Finally, there must be such testimony as is prohibited
by the Statute. Only such testimony as is related to trans-
Giering v. Sauer, 120 Md. 295, 87 A. 774 (1913).
Snyder v. Cearfoss, 187 Md. 635, 51 A. 2d 264 (1946).
16 Ortel v. Gettig, 207 Md. 594, 116 A. 2d 145 (1954).
1 7Jones, Exec. v. Selvaggi, 216 Md. 1, 139 A. 2d 246 (1958).
28 It is difficult though to understand the reference to the Dead Man's
Statute since the Statute, by Its terms, merely continues a portion of a
common law testimonial disqualification of parties and has nothing to
do with non-party witnesses. The hearsay rule seems to be clearly appli-
cable to the disputed testimony.
19 Downs v. Maryland & Del. R.R. Co., 37 Md. 100 (1872).
21 Smith v. Humphreys, 104 Md. 285, 65 A. 57 (1906); Allers, Trustee
v. Leitch, 213 Md. 390, 131 A. 2d 458 (1957).
J' Supra, n. 15.
0 Heil v. Zahn, 187 Md. 603, 51 A. 2d 174 (1947). For further discussion
of the waiver provision of Art. 35, § 3, see Cross v. Iler, 103 Md. 592,
64 A. 33 (1906) ; Duvall v. Hambleton & Co., 98 Md. 12, 55 A. 431 (1903) ;




actions had with the decedent is objectionable, but dealings
with third persons, as in the present case, are not in-
cluded in the prohibition. Unquestionably, an affirma-
tive reply by a party-defendant to a question relating
to transactions with the plaintiff's decedent is pro-
hibited, but the court has also ruled that a de-
nial is just as much within the proscription of the
statute - "a witness testifies to a 'transaction' no
less when she denies than when she affirms a transaction
with a party deceased."28 As pointed out in an earlier dis-
cussion, one doubtful area which has recently been clari-
fied by the Court of Appeals concerns the testimony of
survivors to an automobile collision; the Court has ruled
that Article 35, Section 3 does not exclude a party's testi-
mony as to the movement of the survivor's car, the ob-
served course and speed of decedent's car, and the place
of collision, because this is not a "transaction. 2 4 Further,
the Court cautions that Section 3 of the Statute must be
read in the light of Section 1, which provides generally
that witnesses shall not be excluded from giving evidence
by reason of interest, "except as hereinafter excepted,"
but "generally speaking, the exception [Section 3] has been
rather narrowly construed." 5
First enacted by Chapter 109, Acts of 1864, the Mary-
land Dead Man's Statute remains merely as a remnant
of the common law disqualification of all interested wit-
nesses.26 By Chapter 495, Acts of 1902, the exception
was expressed basically in the present form with amend-
ments added in Chapter 661, Acts of 1904. The general
Supra, n. 17, 11. The court decided that the following questions were
clearly improper: "Did you at any time exert on him any undue influence
or influence of any kind?" and "Did you at any time perpetrate any fraud
on Mr. Weinman ?"
"Shaneybrook v. Blizzard, 209 Md. 304, 121 A. 2d 218 (1955). The
reasoning of the court is discussed supra, at note 10.
MId., 309.
04 MD. COD (1860) Art. 37, §§ 1-7, entitled Competency of Witnesses,
makes no reference to testimonial disqualiflcations of parties but contains
restrictions as to the admissibility of testimony of Negroes, mulattoes, or
Indians in evidence. With the repeal of these sections by Md. Laws 1864,
Ch. 109, the Legislature enacted substitute sections in an attempt to
abolish the common law disqualification of witnesses because of interest;
however, by Art. 37, § 2, the lawmakers reflected the lingering doubts
of that day in the form of the first Dead Man's Statute in the state:
"When an original party to a contract or cause of action Is dead
or shbwn to be lunatic or insane or when an executor or administrator
Is a party to the suit, action, or other proceedings, the other party
may be called as a witness by his opponent, but shall not be admitted
to testify on his own offer or upon the call of his co-plaintiff or




purpose of the Statute was to equalize the position
of the parties by imposing silence on the survivors as
to transactions with or statements by the decedent" or at
least by requiring those asserting claims to produce testi-
mony from disinterested persons." Over the years the
Statute has been applied in many decisions in this state;
and as one case expresses it, "the doctrine of stare decisis
as well as the constitutional limitations on the respective
powers of the legislative and judicial branches of our
government forbid us now to change these decisions. If the
rule of evidence is to be altered, the General Assembly,
and not the courts will have to indicate in what respect
and how. '29
With an eye toward possible amendment, the Maryland
State Bar Association recently set up a special committee to
consider revision of Article 35, Section 3, in order to bring
Maryland into line with the more liberal procedures pre-
vailing in some other jurisdictions. The modern trend of
evidence law is to place more and more of the available evi-
dence before the trier of fact, allowing him to evaluate
the probative value of such evidence. A suggested draft
of the revision" was submitted to the members of the
Association for their consideration in an interim report,8
after which the committee drafted the following report:
"It is the conclusion of this committee that human
nature has not changed in the century that has inter-
vened since the Dead Man's Evidence Rule became
the law of this State by Act of the Legislature in 1864.
Practically every experienced trial lawyer and judge
with whom this matter has been discussed feels that
the Rule serves a useful purpose. 32 There is a danger
'Supra, n. 16; Kenny v. Peregoy, 196 Md. 630, 78 A. 2d 173 (1951).
' Grove v. Funk, 131 Md. 694, 104 A. 368 (1917).
2 O'Connor v. Estevez, 182 Md. 541, 545, 35 A. 2d 148 (1943).
0 Draft of Proposed New Section 2 of Article 35:
"In any action by or against the representative of a deceased
person, including an action concerning probate of a will, or by or
against a person incompetent to testify by reason of mental dis-
ability, no written or oral statement of the decedent or incompetent
shall be excluded as hearsay if the judge shall first find that the
statement was made by the decedent or incompetent at a time when
he was competent, and that it was made in good faith and on his
personal knowledge prior to the commencement of the action."
Daily Record, April 14, 1958.
But cf. Morgan, et al., The Law of Evidence, Some Proposals For Its
Reform (1927) 31-32, discussing the response of the Connecticut bench and
bar to that state's statute abolishing the rule of Incompetency as to in-
terested survivors and also admitting relevant hearsay statements by
decedents:
"Of twenty-one lawyers without experience, twenty thought greater
safeguards necessary. Of one hundred and fifty-two having ex-
19611
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in every case when there is only a single survivor
that he will present a fraudulent or exaggerated claim.
At best his claim will be colored. It is difficult if not
impossible in fact to refute such a claim, because
direct evidence is frequently not available. The prac-
tical experience has been that the Rule is an effective
and useful safeguard against such claims, and that,,
if the claim is valid, it is usually possible to assemble
sufficient admissible evidence to support it without
the evidence of the survivor, or that opposing counsel
will not stand, on the Rule when he is convinced that
the claim is just. Thus any apparent inequities in
the Rule are philosophical and not actual.""3
The committee recommendation that the Statute re-
main in its present form, since "there are not sufficient
potential inequities in the practical application of the
rule to warrant dispensing with the safeguards against
real inequities and injustice which it affords,''" was
adopted by the Association at its annual meeting in June,
1959.
The committee decision is directly contrary to the
current of comment by experts elsewhere, which so
strongly advocates revision or abolishment of the Dead
perience, sixty percent were satisfied with the statutes as they are.
The Justices of the Supreme Oourt were unanimously of this opinion,
and eighty-one percent of the Supreme Court Judges agreed. Of the
four Common Pleas Judges, three believed additional safeguards ad-
visable. Outside of these, the only class of lawyers opposed to those
provisions were those who had little or no experience with them.
And those of experience who suggested amendment usually advised
only the requirement of preliminary findings by the judge or the
requirement of corroboration.
Whether the provisions need amendment or not, they are decidedly
to be desired If they aid in the ascertainment of truth rather than
tend to encourage fraud and perjury. Upon the application of this
drastic test all the judges of the Supreme and Superior Courts found
them good; only one judge of the Common Pleas Court dissented,
while one other was in doubt. Therefore, out of nineteen judges of
the higher courts, seventeen, or over eighty-nine percent, believed that
these provisions aid in the ascertainment of truth. Of all lawyers
and judges having any experience, seventy percent regarded them
-as beneficient while only thirteen and five-tenths percent considered
them harmful. Of those having experience in more than five cases,
eighty-four and five-tenths percent thought them a positive help in
the correct solution of litigated issues, and only in the group having
no experience at all was the majority opinion 'to the contrary. In a
word the opposition to these statutes is in inverse ratio to experience
with them."
Transactions Maryland State Bar Association, 64th Annual Meeting,
1959, 227.
8 Supra, n. 33.
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Man's Statute." For example, Dean Wigmore in his care-
ful analysis has stated that the rule rests on "superficial
reasoning;" he objects to the fact that the exclusion of
such evidence precludes honest claims of the living and
that there is no more justification "to save dead men's
estates from false claims then to save living men's estates
from loss by lack of proof. '86
The committee report defends the Statute on the
theory that the reduced possibility of contradiction will
encourage falsehood and that such claims will be difficult
or impossible to refute in the absence of direct evidence.
However, the suspicion with which the testimony of an
interested witness is regarded and the safeguards of
cross-examination and circumstantial evidence make such
deception unlikely.
Because it fails to render the witness totally incom-
petent, but, as discussed previously, only incompetent as
to certain subject matters of testimony, the Statute appears
to rest on false assumptions about the psychology of party-
witnesses. Thus, if a witness were prone to falsify, he
could do so as to matters not within the range of exclu-
sion and in this way still establish a claim. Further, in
providing that the surviving party or interested party may
testify only if called by the adversary, the Statute in effect
denies a recovery to the survivor who, without an outside
witness or written agreement has rendered services, lent
money, or furnished goods, which the representative of the
decedent's estate declines to pay.3 7 In addition, the case
law has allowed third persons to testify to statements
and transactions" under circumstances which would bar
the testimony of a party-witness, thereby blocking perjury
only to encourage subornation of perjury by a party wish-
ing to circumvent the effect of the Statute.
As the committee itself admits in its interim report, 9
the inconsistent interpretations of the Statute appear arti-
ficial - "it seems obvious that the court, in trying to
MSupra, n. 29. See also AMERiCAN LAW INSTITUTE MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE (1942), Rule 101 and Comment; THE UNIFORM RULES OF EVI-
DENCE (1953), Rule 7; 2 WIGMORE, EvIDEN c (3rd ed. 1940) §§ 578,
578a; MORGAN, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM
(1927), 24 (published under the auspices of the Commonwealth Fund).
WIGMORE, loc. cit. 8upra, n. 35.
37It is only fair to note that many meritorious claims are paid because
fairminded counsel refuse to invoke the Statute where technically available,






balance the equities of matters before it, has enforced the
evidentiary bar or found exceptions, depending on, cir-
cumstances of the particular case." The report further
points out that "the volume of cases in which the rule has
been before the Court of Appeals demonstrates either the
difficulty of its application or the harshness of its result
from which many appellants have hoped to obtain relief
by appeal." It would seem to follow from these comments
that a statute which continues to mystify able courts and
good lawyers in its endless complexities of interpretation
and application should be revised or abolished.
Herbert J. Belgrad
FORESEEABLE INTERVENING NEGLIGENCE
NOT A 'SUPERSEDING CAUSE
Jubb v. Ford.'
Appellant's carry-all, with the words "School Bus"
painted on its rear, was used to transport seven mentally-
retarded children to and from school. However, this
"school bus" was not equipped with flashing stop signals
required of school buses by statute,2 and its capacity was
too small to afford it the school bus privilege of stopping
on the travelled portion of the highway.' One rainy day
the carry-all stopped in the slow lane of Ritchie Highway
to discharge the plaintiff into the care of her awaiting
father. A Cadillac approached the "bus" from the rear and
began to pass. When the driver noted the words "School
Bus," he applied his brakes, hoping to stop the statutory
1221 Md. 507, 157 A. 2d 422 (1960).
2 6 MD. CoDm (1957) Art. 66 , § 257.
8 Id., § 255. The school bus stands in a preferred position on the
American highway. The duty to stop behind a school bus is as "inflexible
. ..as that of obeying the boulevard law and ... a school bus driver has
the right to assume that [the duty] will be obeyed implicitly by cars
approaching from the front and rear." Chackness v. Board of Education,
209 Md. 88, 95-96, 120 A. 2d 392 (1956). Motorists have the concomitant
duty of watchfulness and attentiveness. Richards v. Miller North Broad
Transit Co., 96 N.H. 272, 74 A. 2d 552 (1950); Hughes v. Thayer, 229
N.C. 773, 51 S.E. 2d 488 (1949); Wheaton v. Conkle, 57 Ohio App. 373,
14 N.E. 2d 363 (1937). The motorist's duty is not diminished even if the
school bus stops negligently on the road in violation of statute, and the
motorist's negligence may be the proximate cause of the injury to a child
alighting from such school bus. Allyn & Bacon Book Publishers v.
Nicholson, 58 Ga. App. 729, 199 S.E. 771 (1938). Where the school bus
has electric signal devices in working order as required by statute, the oper-
ator need not give hand signals as required of other users of the highway.
Webb v. Smith, 176 Va. 235, 10 S.E. 2d 503, 131 A.L.R. 558 (1940). For
a comprehensive discussion, see 30 A.L.R. 2d, 105 (1953).
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